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In April 2001 Junichiro Koizumi became Prime Minister of Japan. Since then analysts
and pundits have argued over whether he would succeed in restructuring the nation's
economy or prove another in its seemingly endless series of incompetent leaders. Yet
this debate is beside the point, for its premise-that corporate and banking reform would
return Japan to the path of economic growth and avert a financial disaster-is no longer
valid. It is simply too late for the country to avoid a crisis, probably in the latter half of
this decade, that will destabilize its domestic politics, endanger its global network of
financial and trading relations, and collaterally damage many other countries. Rather than
focusing on the successive acts of the Koizumi drama, therefore, it would make more
sense to identify the threat Japan poses to the rest of the world and to prepare for its
consequences.
The Burdens of History
To understand how Japan's economy became so dysfunctional, one must look beyond the
country's deflation, inefficient corporations, and debt-riddled banks to the underlying
malady that produced these symptoms: excessive savings. This problem has afflicted
Japan for decades, and its continued existence augers ill for the 2000s.
A country's gross savings rate is determined primarily by the behavior of households and
corporations. Households save money to purchase homes, pay for education, and provide
for retirement. Japanese, however, have long tended to put aside more of their income
than do their peers in other G7 economies. One reason for this frugality is the relatively
high price of housing, which means that aspiring homeowners must accumulate more
money for down payments. Another is the country's demographic profile: a very large
number of workers are in their forties, fifties, and sixties, the ages at which people
everywhere save the most. Corporations, meanwhile, retain earnings largely to finance
their present and future investment needs. If market forces function properly, they
disgorge the rest of their income to their owners, who are ultimately households. But
when market forces are attenuated and do not motivate companies to distribute their
profits, they sometimes hold that capital internally and use it for uneconomical purposes.
This raises the corporate savings rate and, by diminishing the flow of resources to
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workers and investors, additionally compels households to save more in order to achieve
their target levels of wealth. In this sense the Japanese government's historical practice
of shielding feckless companies from the rigors of market competition has prevented the
gross national savings rate from falling even as the country approached, and then
attained, economic maturity. As late as the period 1993-2000 Japan's rate averaged 31%
of GDP, as opposed to 20% for the European Union and 16% for the admittedly
improvident United States.
This persistent capital surplus puts Japan in a real quandary. When too many companies
and individuals refrain from spending, there is not enough aggregate demand to absorb
the goods and services that the economy produces. Inventories then accumulate, workers
are laid off, and commercial activity decelerates: a serious recession might ensue. If this
downturn frightens people and they react by hoarding still more of their income, the
imbalance between supply and demand worsens and recession transmogrifies into
depression. Since its savings rate is more than 10% higher than the EU's, and almost
twice that of United States, it is not surprising that Japan has long had trouble achieving
significant GDP growth.
To avoid prolonged economic contraction, a country in such circumstances must find
someone who wants to borrow and spend its excess savings. Only three groups can
perform this function: corporations seeking to acquire new plant and equipment, a
government wanting to finance a budget deficit, or foreigners who intend to purchase
more Japanese products. Over the last few decades Japan has employed all three of these
expedients. In the 1970s the government ran a budget deficit that absorbed much of the
country's extra savings; and when that deficit was eliminated in the early 1980s, the
country exported more of its superfluous capital through a growing current account
surplus. Diplomatic pressure and a stronger yen then combined to discourage this
expedient, and in the latter half of the decade the external surplus shrank to the 2.5%-
3.0% of annual GDP that has obtained ever since. This was still large by international
standards-more than enough, obviously, to irritate other countries-but it accounted for
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only a fraction of the country's capital surfeit and hence left Japan's macroeconomic
dilemma largely unresolved.
Since the middle 1980s corporate investment has been a much more important source of
demand. Judging from the experiences of the United States and Germany, which are the
other global leaders in industry and technology, the equilibrium rate of private non-
residential investment in a mature economy is about 10% of GDP per annum. Spending
at this pace enables companies to replace obsolete plant and equipment while also
amassing an appropriate volume of new capacity. Depending on such other factors as the
growth of the country's labor force, this volume of capital expenditures suffices to
generate a healthy expansion in GDP: perhaps 2% per year in Germany and 2.5-3.0% in
the United States. If investment rises above that equilibrium level, short-term economic
output will also increase because capital accumulation is itself productive activity. But
such extraordinary spending worsens a country's long-term prospects by creating more
industrial capacity than can profitably be employed. The result-as should be familiar to
Americans now that the euphoric over-investment of the late 1990s has given way to
recession-is often a protracted economic slowdown.
Japan's bout of over-investment was much longer and more profound than anything the
United States would later experience. As the country approached developed-nation status
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, its ratio of capital expenditures to GDP declined toward
the US and German level: between 1980 and 1984 it averaged a fairly reasonable 13.4%.
But then the downward trend reversed. Unduly loose monetary policy, poor regulation,
and reckless lending by Japanese banks encouraged enterprises to expand their collective
capital budget to 17.6% of GDP in 1988 and then to over 20% of that standard in 1990
and 1991. This was almost twice what a sophisticated economy like Japan should have
been spending, and it explains much of the over-capacity and poor productivity have
characterized the country ever since.
Over the course of the 1990s the ratio of capital expenditures to national output has
declined somewhat, reaching 15.5% in 2001. This decrease was welcome insofar as it
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meant that some industries were becoming more efficient, but it also resurrected the
specter of inadequate aggregate demand and left Japan, once again, seeking an outlet for
its capital, goods and services. Enlarging the trade surplus was not a realistic option, for
doing so would have infuriated Tokyo's diplomatic and commercial partners as well as
hurting influential domestic lobbies. By default, the path of least resistance was fiscal
stimulus. Yet this could not take the form of mere "pump-priming", for once the surge in
government spending subsided the country would again confront a structural savings
surplus. What Japan required was constant state demand that would soak up its unneeded
capital year after year. It was thus natural that the government budget would move from a
surplus at the beginning of the 1990s to a deficit of 2.4% of GDP in 1993 and thence,
gradually, to 8% of GDP in 2001. This expansionary fiscal policy compensated for
shrinkage in the corporate sector and enabled Japan to achieve real growth of
approximately 1% per annum in the 1990s rather than stagnating completely or falling
into a depression.
Having relied on aggressive corporate and governmental spending for so long, Japan now
finds itself in dire straits. Unwise investment has rendered many enterprises insolvent,
undermined the banking system, exacerbated the country's deflationary tendencies, and
lowered the returns households earn on their investments while copious deficits have
inflated the gross national debt from 61% of GDP in 1990 to some 140% of GDP in early
2002. The realization that the government must eventually raise taxes to meet its financial
obligations, meanwhile, has underscored the public's penchant for saving. Thus Japan
today faces the same problem of deficient aggregate demand as it did a decade ago but
possesses considerably fewer resources with which to address that challenge. How it will
avoid a sharp economic contraction in the early 2000s thus becomes a salient question.
The Paths Forward
Given that companies can no longer afford to increase their capital spending, there are
only three ways in which Japan can maintain macroeconomic stability. The first two
options-a massive increase in the current account, and further fiscal deficits-assume
that the country continues to save apace and seek to redress the consequent imbalance by
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bolstering aggregate demand. The third possibility, corporate and financial reform,
would work through a different mechanism. It would make firms more efficient in their
use of capital, thereby lowering the corporate savings rate and channeling more wealth to
households. Workers and individual investors could now achieve their financial goals
more easily and, therefore, would start spending more of their income. With both the
corporate and the household savings rates declining, there would be less excess output for
the government and the foreign sector to absorb. Unfortunately, a detailed examination of
these three strategies demonstrates that, if implemented at this late date, they would all
lead to the same unpleasant outcome: a financial collapse sometime after 2005.
Perhaps the most radical of the three approaches would be intentionally to depress the
value of the yen such that the current account surplus expands dramatically. Several
prominent macroeconomists have espoused this approach. Their contention is that if a
country saves more than it invests, it should ship its excess capital overseas so that
foreigners may buy more of its exports. Extra savings would thus translate, logically and
automatically, into stronger aggregate demand.
The magnitude of the necessary adjustment, however, is daunting. If one assumes, as a
very rough approximation, that the ratio of corporate investment to GDP should decline
from 15.5% to 10% and that the government's budget should move from a deficit of 8%
of GDP toward neutrality, then the gap in aggregate demand could easily exceed a tenth
of national product. To fill that gap, the current account surplus must triple or quadruple
in size. This would require an enormous change in the exchange rate. The present rule of
thumb is that sustained yen depreciation of 10-15% produces a 1% increase in GDP. If
anything like this relationship obtained at such extremes, the currency must fall from
today's rate of some Y120 per dollar to beyond 250 per dollar to yield the additional
demand Japan so clearly needs. Moreover, the currency must stay at this level for five,
ten, or more years-as long, that is, as economic actors insist on saving so much of their
income.
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Skeptics contend that no country possesses the tools necessary to engineer so great a
change in the value of a floating currency. As evidence for this proposition they cite
several episodes in Japan's recent monetary history. Throughout the first half of 2002 the
Bank of Japan (BOJ) was expanding the money supply by over 25% relative to the same
period last year, but this effort had no noticeable effect on the value of the yen. Then,
from April to June the BOJ intervened in currency markets six times, spending a total of
Y4 trillion in an attempt to weaken the yen-only to see the currency rise inexorably
against the dollar. Throughout these months private investors were curtailing their
purchases of US stocks and bonds, and this decrease in demand was much more
important than the BOJ's relatively modest initiatives.
Still, the argument that governments cannot meaningfully affect exchange rates is not
universally correct. In extremis, a central bank could print an infinite quantity of money
and use it to purchase huge volumes of foreign currencies. The laws of supply and
demand would dictate that this eventually make the exchange rate weaken. Thereafter
the central bank would need to continue intervening, printing money as necessary to keep
the current account surplus at its target size. This process might be difficult to manage
precisely, but the only way other countries could prevent it from having the desired
general effect would be to turn on their own printing presses. If the United States and
some of Japan's other major trading partners refrained from such competitive
devaluations, the BOJ should be able to expand the current account surplus quite
significantly.
The second option would be to "muddle through" with fiscal policy, using deficit
spending to absorb extra capital and strengthen aggregate demand. This, Tokyo's de
facto current strategy, is attractive because it permits a modicum of GDP growth while
not requiring painful structural changes within Japan. Vested interests are thus protected
and the political system remains quiescent. Underlying this strategy, however, is an
erroneous belief that the national debt can grow apace without ultimately engendering
serious trouble.
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Japan can definitely bear greater financial burdens than other countries. Its savings rate
is vertiginous, its people own Y729 trillion in deposits at banks and in the postal savings
system, its central bank holds foreign reserves worth X55 trillion, and the current account
surplus brings in between Y10 and Y15 trillion in income from abroad every year. Even
better, this abundant liquidity tends to stay pooled in the country's own capital markets
because, having lost vast sums abroad in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese
investors now prefer to keep their money in yen-denominated assets. Tokyo likewise
benefits from deflation, which has held the real interest rate on the benchmark 10-year
JGB well above 2%, and that on corporate paper still higher. Such returns are respectable
by global standards, and they imply that there is not much penalty for holding yen assets.
As a result, the authorities have been able to float just over 95% of their Japanese
Government Bonds (JGBs) to relatively tractable Japanese capitalists who are much less
likely than foreign speculators to launch an attack on the yen. As long as such favorable
conditions prevail, Tokyo should not have too much difficulty financing its debt.
Yet it is easy to make too much of Japan's strengths. Whereas regulatory pressure and
fear of overseas markets may predispose investors to keep their money at home, even the
most conservative institutions will move offshore if they perceive the domestic risks as
rising too high. The preference for yen-denominated assets is thus relative, and could
erode if the national debt mounted inordinately. Similarly, the notion that the
government need not worry about its finances because it can tax away the private sector's
wealth is fallacious because the effect of doing so would be to impoverish households,
force people to save yet more of their income, and perpetuate the insufficiency of
aggregate demand that is Japan's fundamental structural flaw. Viewed in this light, the
country's unusual financial attributes give it more room to borrow than most countries
enjoy but confer no permanent immunity to market forces.
There is reason to believe, furthermore, that the country has already exhausted much of
its advantage. Since the commonly cited figure for the gross national debt-140% of
GDP as of early 2002-ignores the government's off-balance sheet assets and a wide
range of hidden liabilities, it should only be regarded as a ballpark estimate.
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Nevertheless, the size of the debt is so large, and its rate of increase so fast, that these
measurement errors are ultimately inconsequential. The gross US debt, by comparison,
presently stands at approximately 53% of national output; and the corresponding ratio for
profligate Italy peaked at 125% in 1994 before subsequently beginning to shrink. Judged
by these standards, markets have already given Japan the benefit of the doubt.
Indeed, to stabilize the debt at today's levels Tokyo must adopt spending cuts and tax
hikes that would, in combination, improve its budgetary position by 8% of GDP. It is
hard to see how the government of any democracy could impose such draconian burdens
on its citizenry. A policy of "muddling through", however, would ineluctably cause the
scale of the necessary adjustment to increase. The Economist Intelligence Unit calculates
that the gross national debt will surpass 190% of GDP in 1996 and 230% of that standard
by 2010. Standard & Poors is slightly more sanguine, putting the figure for the latter year
at "only" 200% of GDP. But in either case balancing the budget would require
transferring well over a tenth of annual economic output from the household sector to the
state-a feat that would assuredly be impossible within the present political system.
The day of reckoning need not come soon. Fund managers do not care if a disaster is
inevitable, only if it is likely to occur within the relatively short timeframe over which
they are investing. Institutional investors will accordingly maintain their holdings of
Japanese assets as long as they perceive the benefits of international diversification and
high real yields as outweighing the danger of a market crash. This will enable Tokyo to
issue more and more JGBs, and the national debt will continue to expand even as the
financial system gradually grows more vulnerable. The situation will become especially
parlous toward 2008-2010, when the government must simultaneously increase its social
security payments and roll over a very large volume of outstanding JGBs. Eventually, an
otherwise manageable crisis-perhaps the disintegration of the LDP, the failure of a
major banking group, a terrorist strike in Tokyo, or a military conflict in the Middle
East-will frighten even the most conservative Japanese investors, who will redeploy
their capital to safer foreign markets. The interest rate that the government must pay to
borrow will then rise sharply, and Tokyo will have no alternative but to compel the BOJ
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to print money and purchase prodigious quantities of JGBs. Now the laws of supply and
demand will take effect; and the value of stocks, bonds, and the yen will plunge in a
manner that could, given the right policies, enable the current account surplus to expand.
Belatedly and inadvertently, Japan will have entered the depreciation scenario.
The third way in which Japan might try to maintain macroeconomic balance-and the
one with which both Prime Minister Koizumi and the Bush administration appear
enamored-is structural reform. Enthusiasts variously emphasize deregulation, the
privatization of semi-public corporations, the reorganization of banks, and attracting
more foreign investment, but these programs share some common features. They all, for
example, envisage a period of 2-3 years in which feckless corporations are pushed into
bankruptcy, the unemployment rate rises, and social and political stresses mount. To
ameliorate this pain, they presume supportive macroeconomic policy, including tax cuts
and additional fiscal spending. Finally, they all expect the companies that emerge from
this process to be more profitable and more willing to release their earnings to the
household sector. Once the economy has started expanding again, a combination of
higher returns on market investments and better employment prospects will encourage
households to increase their consumption. With both the corporate and the household
savings rates falling, Japan's capital surplus will contract and the corresponding strains
on the government budget and the current account will abate.
The logic informing this scenario, however, is flawed in several respects. For example,
the reformists' argument does not fully register the effect of restructuring on enterprise
behavior. It is true that greater competition, stronger corporate governance, and a better
understanding of the cost of capital would motivate enterprises to distribute more of their
earnings to shareholders-and hence would lower the corporate savings rate-but market
forces would also compel enterprises to curtail their wasteful investment spending. If
capital expenditures fall as quickly as corporate savings, the sector's net financial
position might not change at all.
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Nor is the household sector's capital surplus likely to contract much. Rehabilitating
banks and corporations is but the first step in repairing the economy: building household
wealth so that the elderly may retire comfortably is also crucial. This, however, will be a
real challenge. People did not feel sufficiently rich in 1989 and 1990, at the height of the
real estate and stock market bubbles; and since then, they have lost over X500 trillion in
wealth and seen their future tax burdens grow more onerous. If workers want to recoup
some of these losses before leaving their jobs, they will insist on hoarding their income
long after the restructuring process has reached fruition. In other words, if Japan
embarked on a program of comprehensive reform in early 2003 and completed that effort
by early 2006, consumption would stay anemic through the end of the decade. In the
interim, the country would still suffer from an elevated savings rate and inadequate
aggregate demand, the government would be forced to maintain its aggressive fiscal
policy, and the national debt would grow at more or less the same pace as in the
"muddling through" scenario. Put simply, any invigoration of domestic demand would
come too late to render the government's finances sustainable.
In summary, then, all three strategies lead to the same destination: yen depreciation and a
massive expansion in the current account surplus. The differences lie in the timing of this
adjustment and the extent of the ensuing economic trauma. In the case of intentional
devaluation the currency falls quickly, whereas in the fiscal and reform cases
depreciation comes much later-possibly toward 2010 -- and is triggered by capital flight.
This delay is important because it translates directly into a bigger national debt. If the
adjustment occurred today, when the debt is "only" 140% of GDP, the inflationary
transfer of wealth from creditor households to indebted corporations and the government
would be relatively modest. But if the adjustment is postponed until the country's
obligations have grown larger, it will require commensurately more inflation and a
greater fall in living standards to redress its finances. The question, therefore, is how
much Japan is willing to pay for a few more years of relative tranquility.
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The Road Chosen
The safest bet is that the country will dither as long as possible and then pay a very high
price. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has maintained power for the last 47
years, almost without interruption, by cultivating close relations with a range of
established economic interests. Some of these depend heavily on imports and would be
severely harmed if the yen weakened. Households, too, would suffer as depreciation
eroded their ability to purchase foreign goods and services. Political exigency would thus
inhibit the main factions of the LDP from embracing a policy of aggressive depreciation.
Equally compelling in this regard is the effect that a plummeting yen would have on
Japan's diplomatic stature. When the currency fell to ¥147 per dollar in August 1998,
China denounced Japan's behavior as irresponsibly hurting its neighbors and temporarily
persuaded the Clinton administration that Beijing was a more reliable diplomatic partner
than Tokyo. Memories of this discomfiture are vivid in Japan, as are fears that another
episode of marked depreciation would permanently vitiate the country's international
powers. So while LDP governments may favor moderate depreciation to stimulate GDP
growth within the existing economic system, they will not seek to balance aggregate
supply and demand through the current account. Instead, they will pursue a spendthrift
fiscal policy, probably interspersed with some half-hearted attempts at reform, until
investors panic and Japan's markets crash.
By itself, however, a sharp fall in the value of the yen will not close the gap between
aggregate supply and aggregate demand. Once the yen has dropped to Y160 or Y180 per
dollar the Japanese government will presumably panic, announcing far-reaching
structural reforms and pledging to raise taxes and cut the budget deficit. Capitalists may
then reallocate their money back into Japan either to participate in the promised corporate
restructuring or, more cynically, to benefit from short-term market rallies. This inflow
would push the exchange rate back up. The benefits of a weaker yen would also decrease
due to "real appreciation", as the higher price of imports gradually pushed up export
prices and thereby eroded Japan's gains in competitiveness. For both of these reasons
Japan could reach a new economic equilibrium with the real value of the yen somewhat
lower than today, and the current account somewhat bigger, but with aggregate demand
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still deficient. Since GDP growth would remain elusive, the government must persist in
its deficit spending to prevent recessions, and the national debt would continue to rise-
albeit more slowly than in the late 1990s and early 2000s. After some time a new shock
would precipitate capital flight, provoking the second in what could prove a long series of
cyclical disturbances.
Yet if at any point Tokyo chose to interpret the yen's depreciation as a sort of force
majeure, relieving it of its domestic and international constraints and enabling it
uninhibitedly to cultivate external demand, the outcome might be more positive. In this
case the government would prevail upon the BOJ to purchase as much foreign currency
as necessary to counteract capital inflows and real appreciation, thereby keeping the
current account surplus near its target size. Foreigners would denounce this intentional
depression of the exchange rate, to be sure, but Tokyo could reasonably respond that it
was in everyone's interests that the world's second-largest economy return to health. In
effect, Japan would force the rest of the world to adjust to its preferred level of savings.
The Implications for the Rest of the World
The threat posed by Japan's financial problems should not be underestimated. Smaller
countries have occasionally run very large current account imbalances, but it would be
virtually unprecedented for a global economic power to produce a surplus that
consistently measured 10% of GDP. At today's exchange rate that would mean an
additional $400 billion in net Japanese exports and an equal volume of new capital
outflows. The world could not easily absorb such a shock. Among the particular
challenges would be the destabilization of Japan's domestic politics, greater volatility in
the country's foreign and military policies, and a strong deflationary influence over East
Asian and global markets.
Within Japan, depreciation of the magnitude contemplated in this paper would wreak
havoc in import-dependent industries, causing bankruptcies to proliferate, banks to fail,
and the unemployment rate to surge. In this sense the country would experience many of
the social and political stresses that it avoided so sedulously in the 1990s. During this
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interlude there will inevitably be recriminations against those politicians, regulators, and
business people whom the electorate blames for its discomfiture. If the LDP has survived
until this late date, it may now fragment and its factions coalesce with other political
groups to form new parties with distinct ideologies and objectives. No one should be
surprised if several governments rose and fell in rapid succession, and if Japan's internal
and external policies became rather mercurial.
The possibility of diplomatic instability is one that deserves particular attention. Among
the likely targets of popular indignation will be foreign interests that are perceived as
having contributed to, or profited from, Japan's misfortune. This would be particularly
hazardous for China, which has long tried to supplant Japan as the dominant political and
economic power in East Asia and whose assertiveness is already a source of some
consternation in Tokyo. As Japan slides into economic turmoil and voters lose
confidence in their leaders, the public may grow more fearful of Chinese influence and
the bilateral relationship become more contentious. But US interests could also be
jeopardized, for while the Bush administration has wisely refrained from the "Japan
Bashing" of the late 1980s and early 1990s, it has vociferously urged Tokyo to
implement structural reforms that would entail considerable pain but can no longer avert
a financial crisis. If the Japanese people believe that this advice was wrong, or
tendentious, they may blame the United States for their travails.
It is at this point that Japan's economic tragedy could threaten East Asia's security.
Whatever its shortcomings, the LDP has long supported the defensive alliance with the
United States. This bulwark has obviated the need for Tokyo to develop an independent
military policy, and hence has fostered the pacifistic culture that now flourishes there as
well as partially assuaging the geopolitical concerns of other regional states. It would be
a pity if this advantageous situation were undermined by a combination of popular fury at
the LDP and misunderstanding of Washington's role in the economic debacle. For in
these circumstances many Japanese might decide that they cannot rely on outside
assistance and that their country must adopt a more assertive security policy. The
likelihood of strategic miscalculation in East Asia would then rise.
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The economic repercussions of a Japanese crisis would be equally profound, as illustrated
by the cases of Southeast Asia, China and Hong Kong, and the United States. Since 1998
most of the Southeast Asian countries-with the exception of Malaysia and a few
others-have abandoned their pegs to the dollar and opted either for floating exchange
rates or for pegs to trade-weighted baskets of foreign exchange. As a result, many of the
regional currencies have tended to move in closer alignment with the yen than they did in
the past. With more or less government intervention, those currencies should be able to
follow the yen downward against the dollar and the euro. But this transition would not be
smooth; for the yen's value may fluctuate widely while Japan works to achieve a new
equilibrium, and the other currencies could not replicate those movements exactly. Even
if this volatility proved transitory, it would increase the markets' perception of risk; raise
the cost of hedging; and, on the margin, discourage international investment. Although
these setbacks should not prove insuperable for comparatively resilient states such as
Thailand and Singapore, they might upset the already fragile government of Indonesia
and they could divert its neighbors' attention from the struggle against terrorism and
other multi-national endeavors. It seems likely that all diplomatic campaigns involving
the region would become somewhat harder to organize and prosecute.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (SAR) are situated differently because their currencies are pegged and fixed,
respectively, to the dollar. Here depreciation would require overt changes in policy. As
in 1998, however, the PRC's first inclination would be to defend the existing Renminbi
exchange rate and to contrast its restraint with Tokyo's failure to support the yen. At a
time when many of the other East Asian currencies were rapidly losing value, this
resoluteness would earn Beijing considerable gratitude in Washington and many other
capitals. Any longer-term decision must wait until the impact of the yen's depreciation
on China's external balance became clear. Then the choice would be made on
mercantilist grounds: if adhering to the peg caused the current account to deteriorate into
a structural deficit, the government would opt for devaluation in order to protect its
foreign reserves. Yet this would presumably be a modest change, one that left the
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Renminbi significantly stronger, on average, than it is today and hence allowed the PRC
to argue that it was helping promote regional stability and global economic growth.
This effective appreciation would present various domestic difficulties. Trade comprises
almost half of China's GDP, so depending on how strong the Renminbi remained, the
country could lose anywhere from one to three percentage points from its annual growth
rate. If the losses were minimal, their primary impact would be to retard the pace of
political and economic reform. Beijing believes that its present growth rate is only
slightly above the level necessary to maintain social stability, and when economic
activity decelerates the government routinely tempers or postpones controversial policy
initiatives. Thus one might expect the PRC to step back from the reorganization of the
State-Owned Enterprises, the restructuring of the state banks, and further efforts to
increase tax revenues. But if the losses were larger, the Chinese government would see
its public support diminish and could experience more frequent instances of popular
unrest. Frightened by these trends, Beijing may feel compelled to repress dissent even
more ruthlessly than it presently does, or to play the nationalist card by adopting a
bellicose attitude toward Taiwan and inveighing against the United States and Japan for
their contributions to that island's defacto autonomy. If this happened at a time when the
Japanese people were already feeling insecure, the probability of strategic
misunderstandings would perforce increase.
Hong Kong would likewise be caught between a desire to hold fast to its present
exchange rate on the one hand, and the challenge of a regional devaluation on the other.
The SAR got a foretaste of this dilemma in the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and
1998, when most of its neighbors' currencies plummeted in value. Because its exchange
rate with the US dollar was fixed by means of a currency board, Hong Kong's terms of
trade deteriorated sharply; and the only way the economy could regain its
competitiveness was through a debilitating bout of deflation. Thus producer and
consumer prices declined by 4.7% and 9.4%, respectively, from 1997 to 2001. The effect
of deflation on asset prices was even more pronounced-as evidenced by a 46% slide in
the Hang Seng stockmarket index in the year after August 1997. Not surprisingly, given
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this enormous loss of wealth, Hong Kong's real growth rate slowed from an average of
4.6% between 1994 and 1996, to 2.5% in 1997, and then to an alarming -5.7% in 1998.
At least some of this pain might have been avoided if the SAR had chosen the path of
devaluation.
Hong Kong is still vulnerable to this dynamic. If the yen and other East Asian currencies
suddenly depreciated and then stabilized at much lower levels, prices within the SAR
must again adjust downward. But since the scale of the regional devaluation would be
much larger than in 1997, the ensuing recession would also be deeper, longer, and more
painful. Hong Kong's standard of living would fall in this process, and criticism of the
government would intensify until at some point the authorities felt compelled to
reconsider their commitment to the currency board.
Widespread depreciation would likewise harm the US economy. In the emerging
markets crises of 1997 and 1998 the United States played a very important remedial role:
the Federal Reserve held interest rates lower than it would otherwise have done in order
to provide liquidity to the global economy and to stimulate spending by American
corporations and households. In essence, the people of the United States functioned as
"consumer of last resort", providing the incremental aggregate demand needed to prevent
a global recession. But this was a costly policy insofar as subnormal interest rates
contributed to distortions in asset prices and excessive corporate investment. These
excesses were revealed when the bubble burst, leading to a recession in 2001 and
depressing GDP growth for months, and perhaps years, thereafter. Saving the world
would prove even more costly if the yen attained a long-term equilibrium somewhere
beyond ¥250 per dollar. Japan provides 11% of all US imports, and most of these are
concentrated in a few sectors, such as automobiles and electronic goods. If the dollar
price of these imports declined by half, the unemployment rate in some American
industries and geographical areas would spike upward. The devaluation of other Asian
currencies would exacerbate this effect, especially if China, which accounts for another
9% of US imports, followed suit. Thus a wave of deflation would emanate across the
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Pacific and engulf the United States, sweeping away many corporations and banks and
causing protectionist sentiment to rise.
Washington would presumably resist this pressure because, as in the late 1990s, it would
see the stabilization of the global economy as essential to American interests. So rather
than engaging in competitive devaluation or raising new barriers to trade, the US
government would attempt to invigorate domestic commerce. Monetary policy, however,
would quickly prove ineffectual. The United States has already absorbed several
deflationary blows-including the stagnation of the Japanese economy, the financial
crises of the middle and late 1990s, and the implosion of the American stockmarket
bubble-and these have persuaded the Federal Reserve to lower short-term interest rates
to a scant 1.75%. If interest rates are still this low when the Japanese debacle occurs, the
Fed will have very little room for further monetary stimulus and the government will be
forced to rely disproportionately on fiscal spending as a means of bolstering aggregate
demand.
This would be inconvenient in at least two respects. First, since the Japanese yen and
several other East Asian currencies would remain weak for five or ten years, the United
States must persist in its loose fiscal policy for a long time. It would now be the
American government and not US households or corporations that served as "consumer
of last resort". The budget deficit and the national debt would accordingly rise more
quickly than economists presently reckon. Second, and more problematically, the United
States would now have fewer tools with which to address additional contingencies. In
the event of a major terrorist strike against the United States, or a war in the Middle East
or on the Korean Peninsula, the Federal Reserve could not react by slashing interest rates
and the executive might have trouble expanding the budget deficit still further. The same
logic would apply to the other economies-certainly the European Union and perhaps
China-that were resisting the temptation to debase their currencies. Put simply, none of
the big economies could easily provide additional aggregate demand, and the risk of a
global recession would be greater than at any point in the last several decades.
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Conclusion
Given the magnitude of these risks, it is essential that the international community take
another look at Japan's economic situation and prospects. Instead of observing that Japan
is not Botswana or Argentina-which is both true and irrelevant-the optimists should
explain how Tokyo can close a budgetary gap that totals 8% of GDP and will only grow
larger with the passage of time. If they cannot offer a plausible answer to this question,
then they must acknowledge that the national debt is already beyond control. Meanwhile,
rather than throwing up their hands in frustration at Japan's official intransigence, the
pessimists should focus on the implications of a debt crisis. These include internal and
diplomatic instability, short-term volatility in foreign exchange markets, and pronounced
deflationary tendencies in global financial markets.
The major powers must prepare for these eventualities. Geopolitically, they must work to
ensure that Japan's financial collapse does not jeopardize East Asia's diplomatic and
security relationships. For Beijing, this means assuming a less critical stance toward
Tokyo and letting events naturally and unobtrusively enhance Chinese influence. For
Washington, it requires shifting to a conservative rhetorical position that de-emphasizes
economic policy and focuses instead on the importance of continued defensive
cooperation. In addition, the United States should seek greater operational integration of
its armed forces and Japan's so as to engender more mutual trust and respect. Such
goodwill is invaluable, for it improves the chances that the Japanese people will remain
committed to the bilateral alliance even in adverse circumstances. Economically,
meanwhile, the G7 countries should tolerate a higher degree of inflation and nominal
interest rates than they have in recent years so that central banks have more tools with
which to address future emergencies. Perhaps the European Union should revisit its
Stability Pact, which, by limiting governments' fiscal and monetary powers, is already
retarding GDP growth. What these and other governments must realize is that the
greatest threat to global prosperity is no longer inflation but deflation, and its
embodiment is Japan.
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